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The development of capitalism was at the centre
of economic thought during the century that
followed the publication in 1776 of Adam Smith's
The Wealth of Nations. It was the fundamental
concern of classical political economy. From the
last quarter of the nineteenth century until the
1950s, that concern, and political economy itself,
were removed from the mainstream of economic
thought. Neoclassical economic theory, with its
focus on the behaviour of individual producers
and consumers in perfect or imperfect markets,
and theories that attempted to explain the
cyclical instability of capitalism, took over.
The subject of development started to reappear
in economic thought only in the 1950s, but
now referred to the economic problems of the
countries that had not become industrialised by
that time. The economic development of under-
developed countries, which is what we really
have in mind when we now speak of develop-
ment thinking, is a very recent subject in the
evolution of economic thought. Hardly any book
published before 1950 had the word development
in its title, universities did not offer courses on
the subject, special development institutes did not
exist, nor did development experts. Technical
assistance as we know it now became a sub-
stantial operation only with President Truman's
Point IV Programme and the UN Technical
Assistance Programme.
The recent first inter-regional meeting of the
four Associations that represent hundreds of in-
stitutions devoted to development studies in
Africa, Asia, Europe and Latin America attests
to the importance that the subject has acquired
in just over two decades.' But the boom that it
enjoys is in stark contrast to the crisis of the
development process itself. One of the con-
sequences of this disparity is the need for a
critical reappraisal. At a moment when new
policies, strategies and models are being pro-
posed it is worth looking back upon the inter-
action between development thinking and devel-
opment practice over the last two decades,
because it may have important lessons for the
future.
1 The Development of Development Thinking, Report of the
First Intr-Rvgionai Meeting on Develooment Research,
Communication and Education, 12-16 September, 1976,
organised jointly by the Institute of Development Studies,
and the OECD Development Centre.
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I propose to examine the evolution of develop-
ment thinking from three main perspectives: the
nature of the political economies that have con-
stituted the object of development thought since
the 1 950s and of their international context; the
nature of economic thought when development
became a fundamental issue at this time; and
the ways in which development thinking res-
ponded to the development process itself.
Before embarking on this difficult exercisea
sort of sociology of knowledge of development
thinkingI would like to point out that it is
not based on systematic research, but rather on
personal experience; that this experience is
essentially that of Latin America and therefore
of the overwhelming hegemonie presence of the
United States; and that it is the experience of
an economist.
Let me start by identifying some of the basic
structural characteristics of the underdeveloped
economies around 1950 as well as some basic
changes that were taking place internally and in
the international context. Most underdeveloped
countries were still colonies at that time, though
a few had just become independent, and some-
most of the Latin American countrieshad been
independent for over a century. All were
economically, politically and culturally linked to
one or other of the industrial countries to which
they exported primary products and surplus, and
from which they imported manufactures, human
resources, investments, technology, institutions,
ideas, values, culture.
The size of the sector that consumed these
importsthe so-called modern sectordepended
on three factors: the size of the total surplus
generated in the export sector; the proportion of
it that the local ruling groups managed to keep
and consume or invest (the more they invested
locally the more their productive base expanded);
and the degree to which the ruling groups ex-
ploited the rest of society, which they achieved
partly by preserving the pre-existing local in-
stitutions and culture and partly by destroying
them in order to generate an abundant supply
of cheap labour. As a consequence the national
economy, society, polity and culture were highly
heterogeneous. Differing socio-economic, political
and cultural forms interacted, though all were
to a greater or a lesser extent dominated by
capitalist relations of trade and! or production.
The Great Depression, World War II, decolonisa-
lion and the Cold War changed the power
balance within the ruling classes of many
countries. The groups linked more closely to the
traditional export interests were weakened, and
new middle-class sectors (professionals, small
entrepreneurs, industrialists where some industry
had developed previously and new political
leaders and groups to represent them) were
strengthened. The basic objective of these new
groups was the promotion of industrialisation as a
means to generalise the consumption patterns and
life styles acquired by importing the life styles of
the industrial countries (the demonstration effect,
as it was then called). To make this possible, they
had to increase their control over the foreign
sector in order to capture a larger proportion of
the surplus needed to finance increased consump-
tion and investment. The State became in this
way the active instrument of a new policy aimed
at the local reproduction of the characteristics
of mature capitalist countries: industrialisation,
agricultural modernisation, infrastructure, in-
creased provision of social services and so forth.
The countries that had all these things were the
developed countries, those that lacked them were
underdeveloped, and development was the pro-
cess of transition from one situation to the other.
This way of thinking about development was
furthermore intensely promoted from abroad,
particularly by the United States, the new capitalist
centre, as a foreign policy instrument in the
context of the Cold War. The external support
of national ruling classes against challenges from
the left became an all-important objective in the
capitalist camp. (This was the case not only in
the underdeveloped world, but even more so in
Europe, where the main instruments were NATO,
the Marshall Plan and European economic in-
tegration.) Correspondingly, the national ruling
classes in the underdeveloped countries saw the
USA and Western Europe as guardians of their
interests and as socio-political and economic
models. The development of modern industrial
capitalism in these countries therefore became
their long-term aim which was held in common
with the ruling classes of the major Western
powers. This frequently contributed to an
acceleration of the disintegration of the
European colonial empires and to a further
strengthening of the USA as the capitalist super-
power.
Let us now look quickly at the economic thought
available around 1950 to help policy-makers,
experts and advisers formulate the best policies
for the development of underdeveloped countries.
There was, of course, political economy, the
locus classicus of the analysis of the emergence
and expansion of industrial capitalism in Great
Britain. But the writings of the founding fathers
of economics were considered to have been over-
taken by the scientific progress of the discipline,
and had therefore been relegated to museum
pieces. Their great analytical strength, the attempt
to relate the growth of the capitalist mode of
production and the operation of the economics
of the market to the changing nature of social
classes and the consequent redistribution of
power, within the historical context of the world-
wide expansion of industrial capitalism and im-
perialism, was precisely what had been expur-
gated and replaced by positive economic theory.
The most important body of thought inherited
from classical political economyMarxismhad
been suppressed everywhere: in the capitalist
world by McCarthyism, in the socialist camp by
Stalinism. In the name of scientific progress and
the Cold War, the dynamics of capitalism had
been exorcised from economics, and we were left
with the two main paradigms of pure economics:
neo-classical economic theory (including the com-
parative cost theory of international trade) and
Keynesian macroeconomics.
These schools corresponded to the needs and
characteristics of mature capitalism: the efficient
operation of individual firms and consumers in
national and international markets; and the
avoidance of cyclical instability with short-term
policies of full employment and long-term
strategies of growth. But for underdeveloped
countries the policies derived from these theories
amounted to a drastic programme of economic,
political, social and cultural transformation. Few
of them satisfied the assumptions underlying
neoclassical and Keynesian economics, or, to be
more precise, these assumptions corresponded
only to a partial segment of reality: that more
closely related to the export sector and the main
cities. Money was not a universal means of ex-
change, it was used in urban and to some extent
in urban-rural transactions, but less frequently
within rural communities. With the exception
of some export activities and the urban sector
there was hardly a labour market, as most people
remained attached to rural communities and in-
stitutions of one type or another. The modern
capitalist type of enterprise was largely foreign,
and was to be found mainly in the export sector
and in trade, and only to a small extent in manu-
facture. Basic social capitalsuch as roads,
energy, communications, railroads, portswas
again available only to the export sector and
main cities; these were in fact in better contact
with the metropolitan centres than with their
own hinterlands. Education was restricted to a
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small urban elite. Financial institutionsapart
from some branches of foreign bankshardly
existed. The State apparatus was limited in geo-
graphical and operational scope, and had a weak
and highly unstable tax base, mainly in the
foreign sector.
If theory did not correspond to reality, so much
the worse for reality: it would have to be
changed so that it would correspond to the
assumptions of neoclassical and macrodynamic
theory. Two main lines of thinking and policy
emerged. On one hand were the conservatives-
intellectual representatives of the old order-
who maintained that the traditional specialisa-
tion in primary exports constituted the best
engine of growth, provided that the industrial
countries also achieved full employment and
growth. The benefits of specialisation and com-
parative advantage would then be spread from
the export sector to the rest of society and
development would eventually be achieved.
This line of thinking, however, went against the
interests of the new social groups that were
emerging out of the struggle against the old
alliance of the local oligarchy and imperialism.
Emerging national bourgeoisies were trying to
gain control of the State in order to capture
a larger share of the surplus generated in
the export sector and to use it to promote
industrialisation and modernisation generally.
Macrodynamic theory provided the rationalisa-
tion for an active State role and for a heavy
emphasis on capital accumulation as the basis
for economic growth, although for different
reasons and in different circumstances than those
envisaged by Keynes. Growth modelsincluding
models of capital accumulation used in Soviet
planningand social accounting and input-output
analysis provided practical instruments for
planning.
Theories that were critical of the doctrines of
free trade and international specialisation and
that attributed underdevelopment to the lack of
industrial development (such as those of Prebisch,
Singer, Lewis, Mandelbaum, Rosenstein-Rodan,
Nurksenone of them, interestingly enough, of
Anglo-Saxon origin), provided the rationalisation
for protection, for investment in infrastructure
and manufacturing and for planning. The con-
trast between the heterogeneous reality of under-
developed countries and the assumptions of neo-
classical theory provided the rationale for policies
of institutional reform and modernisation in
agriculture, education, taxation, public admini-
stration and finance
A more radical version of this programme for
the development of national capitalism, strongly
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influenced by an undercurrent of Marxist think-
ing about internal and international exploitation,
surfaced here and there, when political condi-
tions allowed. Heavy emphasis was placed on
nationalisation of foreign investment in the
primary export sector and public utilities, state
ownership of basic industries, trade with socialist
countries and much more drastic agrarian reform
and state planning.
In Latin America these various lines of thinking
crystaiiised during the 1950s around the work
of Raul Prebisch and a group of young
economists at the UN Economic Commission for
Latin America. This institution became the in-
tellectual and technical base for the support of
progressive nationalist and reformist movements
and governments throughout the region, and the
object of bitter attack by conservative gvoups in
Latin America, as well as by the US government,
academic and business interests.
It is easy now with hindsight to point to the
weaknesses and limitations of the new develop-
ment policies pursued since the 1950s. But at a
time when the socio-political and economic
interests related to the primary export sectors
were still very strong, and when threats to them
were automatically labelled a communist plot
and harshly suppressed, it is convenient to recall
that these programmes of nationalist and social
democratic reform were regarded as a revolu-
tionary challenge to the existing internal and
international order.
All this changed dramatically at the end of the
l950s with the Cuban Revolution and the fall
of the dictatorships of Perez Jimenez in
Venezuela, Odria in Peru and Rojas Pinilla in
Colombia, as well as the change from the
Eisenhower to the Kennedy administration in the
USA. These political events reflected the crisis
of the old order, which could no longer be
supported because it had been substantially
eroded inside Latin America and, as we shall
suggest later, internationally also. The alterna-
tives appeared clear: either a socialist revolution,
or full support for the new emerging social
forces behind industrialisation and modernisation
policies.
It was thought that the latter, including the
expansion of education, rural modernisation, and
urbanisation, would promote social mobility and
diversify the social structure, widening the middle
and entrepreneurial classes which are the indis-
pensable social base of modern capitalist society.
The creation of modern bourgeois societies of
this kind would in turn facilitate the development
of political democracy, as practised in Western
Europe and the USA.
Economic, sociological and political theories
which gave an idealised version of the contem-
porary nature of countries that had reached the
stage of mature industrial capitalism were trans-
formed into a programme of capitalist develop-
ment in the periphery, into an ideology of
development, of which Rostow's The Stages of
Economic Growth: a non Communist Manifesto
is probably the most extreme and explicit ver-
sion. The Alliance for Progress, the response of
the new ruling coalitions of the USA and Latin
America to the Cuban Revolution which had
established a socialist State in the Americas was
the practical expression of a full fledged capitalist
modernisation programme.
Thus the Cold War and the Cuban Revolution
together with the changing internal power struc-
ture in Latin America were critical factors in the
promotion of development and modernisation
programmes in Latin America. These were one
aspect of historical trends of a more economic
and global nature. In particular the emergence
of the USA as the superpower in the capitalist
camp, with its vast endowment of natural re-
sources and its dynamic and expanding industrial
system, was beginning to change the nature of
the international economic order built up by
Britain and Western Europe in the nineteenth
century. After World War II, the massive ex-
pansion of US overseas investment was con-
centrated in manufacturing and related marketing
and financial services rather than in primary
products, apart from oil. Looked at in institu-
tional terms this is the period of the phenomenal
expansion of the transnational corporation. The
Alliance for Progress represented therefore a
coalition of the new transnational industrial
elites of the centre and the modernising elites
of the peripheral countries. For some years, in
the early 1960s, national and international
development efforts seemed well on the way
towards accelerating industrialisation, modern-
isation, urbanisation, social mobility, decolonisa-
tion and political democracy in the countries
that used to be called 'underdeveloped'. Marx's
dictum: "the country that is more developed
only shows to the less developed the image of
its own future", seemed about to be proved
correct.
But the development record of the 1960s and
early 1970s eventually turned out to be ambiva-
lent. Although accelerated economic growth was
supposed to increase employment opportunities,
it soon became apparent that unemployment and
underemployment, particularly in the urban
areas, was rising dramatically and creating
staggering problems of urban poverty. At the
same time skills, income and wealth were con-
centrated in the hands of a small entrepreneurial
and professional elite and income inequality was
accentuated. Although industrial expansion and
diversification had gone quite far in many coun-
tries, the benefits associated with this process
in the developed countries did not materialise.
Rather than the export structure being diversified,
primary product exports continued to predomin-
ate. Instead of the local entrepreneurial class being
strengthened, the subsidiaries of transnational
corporations took over the more dynamic in-
dustrial activities and larger scale enterprises.
With foreign control of industry, capital-inten-
sive innovations were continuously introduced,
intensifying conspicuous consumption and the
waste of existing capital stock, and increasing
imports and other foreign exchange requirements.
In the absence of structural reforms in the rural
areas, which proved to be politically unviable,
agricultural modernisation increased yields and
productivity per man in the larger estates,
generated additional rents for the landowning
class, and contributed to the disruption and stag-
nation of rural communities and smaliholders,
thereby accelerating rural emigration. The same
phenomena of the 'subsidiarisation' and expan-
sion of the larger enterprises, and the consequent
displacement and stagnation of the smaller
national firms, can be seen to a greater or lesser
extent in every branch of economic activity:
trade, construction, finance, transport, mass
media, sometimes even bringing in the State it-
self through its association with foreign sub-
sidiaries.
Urban unemployment and social polarisation led
to a stronger emphasis on 'social' policies: new
attempts at introducing progressive taxation, in-
creased government expenditure on education,
housing and health services, special programmes
in support of the urban poor, regional policies
for backward areas. Given the underlying struc-
tural situation and processes which these policies
attempted to redress, their effects were at best
negligible, and at worst a contribution to the
negative trends enumerated above.
The situation became even more dramatic in the
early 1970s. Governments had been expanding
their activities and expenditures heavily, while
their revenues continued to be derived essentially
from a relatively stagnant and unstable foreign
sector. Similarly, foreign payments on current
and capital account rose rapidly with the increase
in investment, consumption, foreign ownership
and private and public foreign debt, while the
export structure remained essentially unchanged.
Urban income and population growth frequently
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outran the increase in marketable rural produc-
tion. These and other disequilibria fuelled in-
ternal inflation and balance-of-payments crises,
accentuating foreign indebtedness. The need to
control inflation, to limit imports and expand
exports, to control the urban poor and repress
rural uprisings led several countries to introduce
severe deflation policies implemented by authori-
tarian regimes. Rather than easing tensions and
facilitating political democracy, development has
aggravated economic class, cultural and political
polarisation and conflict.
Faced with this situation, development thinking
took two different directions. One argued that
this was the inevitable consequence of the transi-
tion to capitalist development, the price to be
paid in order to achieve development. The other
elaborated a radical critique, suggesting that capi-
talist development in the periphery would not
reproduce the historical capitalist development
path, that the current crisis would not be overcome
with more of the same kind of development
policies. The first approach is still followed by the
majority of development practitioners. But
although much development thinking in academic
circles, particularly in the developed countries,
continues to be based on the modernisation
paradigm because of the internal dynamicsor
rather, staticsof the academic establishment,
development thinking among social scientists in-
volved in development planning in the developing
countries began to change radically in the mid-
I 960s, particularly in Latin America.
To begin with, it became increasingly clear that
there had been a reification of economics in
development thinking almost to the exclusion of
other social sciences. It was also apparent that
the solution was not to put the other disciplines
side by side with economics, to engage in the
kind of interdisciplinary approach by aggregation
which had begun to surface in some writing on
development. The problem went much deeper;
it had to do with the static functionalist paradigm
of all the modern social sciencesthe study of
the economic, social and political operation of a
national society, given the structural-historical
conditions of modern urban-industrial capitalism.
The problem of development, on the contrary,
was increasingly seen to be the study of the
changes brought about by the expansion of the
capitalist mode of production into semi and/or
pre-capitalist social formations. Furthermore, it
also became clear that modern capitalism itself
was not static, that it was undergoing significant
change under the influence of the new central
role played by the transnational business sector
in symbiosis with the State, upon the processes of
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capital accumulation, technological innovation
and demand manipulation on a global scale.
Development thought had therefore to start
addressing itself to understanding the contem-
porary dynamics of capitalism, in terms both of
its core and of its peripheries, the relationship
between them andlast but not leastof their
relations with socialism.
In other words, it became evident that the unit
of analysis of development can no longer be the
nation-state alone. Even if one must still begin
from the particular country one is interested in,
its specific historical development process must
be put into the context of the evolution of
capitalism globally and of its local, internal
manifestations. These have typically been the
determining factors that have triggered off pro-
found processes of structural transformation. The
establishment of colonies, the struggle against
the colonisers, decolonisation, the development
of primary product exports, foreign investment in
local manufacturing, the effects of world wars
and crises, transfers of foreign institutions and
culture generallythese all play a central role
in the historical evolution of every under-
developed country.
Although they have occurred at different times
and take different forms, such phenomena con-
stitute the common historical legacy of depend-
ence. But the way in which they work them-
selves out in specific national and local societies
depends essentially on the antecedent nature of
these societies and their historical reaction to
external stimulae. Therefore there are both
common elements and great differences among
the underdeveloped countries. A eurocentric or
global perspective tends to stresS homogeneity; a
national perspective, on the contrary, stresses
heterogeneity and singularity. Both perspectives
are biased, and must complement each other.
The growing body of literature in Latin America,
Africa and Asia on the historical evolution of
countries and regions, in the context of the
development of global capitalism, is throwing
new light on the real nature of the development
process. Economic and social history has received
a great stimulus in the last decade from the
questions raised by the crisis of development, and
comparative history has been a particularly use-
ful exercise for a better understanding of how
contemporary situations have come about. The
reincorporation of the historical dimension into
development thinking has had other positive
effects. For economics itself, it has had the
healthy consequence of forcing the analytical
apparatus of the discipline to adapt to actual
historical reality, rather than the reverse. Tradi-
tional micro and macro theory is being reformu-
lated in an effort to determine the relevant vari-
ables and relationships, and a corresponding
effort is under way to develop operational
categories in terms of appropriate statistical
frameworks. The recovery of the historical
dimension has also made it clear that the dis-
ciplinary specialisation of the social sciences
under the functionalist paradigm has made them
inherently incapable of grasping the nature of
the development process, despite their usefulness
for the analysis of concrete partial situations.
Even if not wholly satisfactory, the analytical
frameworks of classical political economy and
particularly of Marxism do at least go in the
directions required to analyse development:
globalism and wholism. But to be useful they
require historical specificity, in terms of the
analysis of the structural characteristics of par-
ticular societies at given times and places. Even
if we assume that the basic laws of capitalist
development are unchanged, the mode of opera-
tion of capitalist economies varies under different
institutional arrangements and cultural traditions.
Capitalist development is not, as macrodynamic
growth models would have us believe, a cumula-
tive process of mechanical dynamics where every-
thing is determined by an unchanged set of initial
conditions.
On the contrary, as anyone that has actually
been involved in development policy knows,
capitalist development takes place in interaction
with precapitalist and! or earlier capitalist forma-
tions. Its expansion requires a thorough re-
organisation of society, with new social forces
gathering the power and strength to challenge
the existing dominant groups and to take over
the institutions that regulate the generation,
appropriation and utilisation of economic sur-
plus. Economic growth implies changes in social
structure, a redistribution of political power, in-
stitutional and cultural transformation, and this
is a dialectical process, full of conflict.
Not only must there be structural change, but
this change takes place through confrontation.
The State, the main legitimate instrument of
power and force, is usually the crucial battle
ground between the different social groups. It is
a central factor in the process of development,
playing a fundamental role in allocating the sur-
plus generated by the foreign sector to new social
groups. The poverty of the social sciences, and
particularly of economics, including classical
political economy, in terms of their treatment of
the role of the State has undoubtedly been one
of the greatest weaknesses of development
thinking.
The failure to perceive development as capitalist
development, the ignorance of its history and
lack of recognition of its peculiar contemporary
characteristics are some of the reasons why
development specialists have been so surprised
at the results of development: economic growth
with increased unemployment, growing inequality
and polarisation, new forms of dependence, and
authoritarian regimes. The ideological blinkers of
the modernisation paradigm put all the emphasis
on the positive and ex-post aspects of capitalist
development, treating its end productshigh
living standards, relative reductions in social in-
equality, urban-industrial life styles, political
democracyas the means of development. The
real history of capitalist development is made to
stand on its head.
Capitalist development, as Schumpeter so aptly
put it a long time ago, is a process of creative
destruction. It might perhaps be worth recalling
that when Western Europe was becoming in-
dustrialised during the nineteenth century, a sub-
stantial proportion of its population not only had
to leave the countryside, but had to emigrate
overseas. Around 60 million people left Europe
between 1840 and 1920, compared with a total
population in 1900 of around 300 million. Under
present day conditions of the world-wide expan-
sion of a highly innovative and capital intensive
oligopoly capitalism, the destructive effects of
development are still more severe in the peri-
pheral countries than they were in the central
capitalist countries.
In the industrial countries themselves two
decades of unprecedented growth in the capitalist
economy during the 1950s and 1960s also had
unanticipated effects: alienation, consumerism,
waste, excessive concentration of power, destruc-
tion of the environment, bureaucratisation, the
loss of jobs due to industries moving abroad and
so forth. The recent depression, coupled with
inflation, the international monetary crisis, un-
certain prospects for economic growth, the in-
efficacy of Keynesian policies, the decline in the
industrial countries' control over the world's
natural resources and increasing concern about
their availability, the threat of socialism both in
Europe and in the developing countries, indicate
profound development problems in the so-called
developed countries: problems which are not
only national but global, not only economic but
also social, cultural and political. As a con-
sequence, social scientists in these countries are
also beginning to focus again on the central
concern of classical political economy in the
nineteenth century and of development thinking
in recent years: the development of capitalism.
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